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Incentive scheme and productivity in microfinance institutions in Benin 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This article aims to analyze the productive effects of financial and non-financial incentive in 
microfinance institutions in Benin. We estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function 
augmented by the Incentive Scheme on an unbalanced panel of 14 registered MFIs over the 
period 2007-2017. The findings of this study show that non-financial incentives positively 
impact the outreach whereas the financial incentives have a negative effect on outreach. They 
further suggest that a well-designed incentive scheme is a powerful tool to overcome free 
riding and other asymmetric information problems in a costly monitoring environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Investments in developing countries often depend on the forms of financial intermediation, 
which may depend on banks or microfinance institutions (MFIs). Therefore, looking for 
appropriate strategies to improve the productivity of those institutions is very urgent. 
Balkenhol and Hudon (2011) and Biancini et al (2017) argue that productivity and the 
efficiency of MFIs are key indicators that guide the decision of donors. In addition, MFIs 
target joint objectives. First, the social objective which aims at a large number of clients. This 
is because the financial performance of MFIs may be affected positively due to the quality of 
its borrowers (Honlonkou et al, 2006). Second, the objective of financial performance leads 
MFIs to be sustainable in order to keep on providing credit to the poorest (Shea, 2012).  
However, microfinance institutions have experienced remarkable development in recent years 
in Benin, increasing their market share in bank deposit from 10.08% to 84.07% between 1993 
and 2008 (Babatoundé, 2014) thereby inducing competition in the microfinance sector and 
creating productivity gains through innovation facilities (McIntosh et al, 2005; Armandariz 
and Morduch 2010; Balemba, 2015). Moreover, the number of registered MFIs and their 
recipients are constantly progressing as well as the turnover and their implications on 
financial intermediation, banking and monetary regulation in WAEMU (Lanha, 2006; 
BCEAO, 2015). In addition, the strong competition among microfinance institutions compels 
them to efficiently exploit their productive resources and operate at full capacity (McIntosh & 
Wydick, 2005; Armendariz and Morduch, 2007; Amuli et al, 2013; Etro and Cella, 2013; 
Mugaa, 2017). This requires each MFI to know its abilities and limitations and to have a 
thorough knowledge of its intermediation system. Furthermore, it is also important to identify 
the most productive resources and the possibility of improving the less productive ones. Labor 
is one of the most used resources in the production technology of MFIs (Balemba, 2015, 
Nurun et al, 2017). Its compensation determines the incentive to reveal the effort and hence 
the productivity of the employee and consequently the performance of the firm (Groves et al, 
1994; Aubert et al, 2009; Accion, 2013; Ennasri & Willinger, 2014; Tian and Yang, 2014; 
2014; Falola et al, 2014; Guiteras and Jack, 2017). 
Literature points this problem as a profit sharing scheme, incentive scheme or performance 
based pay. This incentive scheme is important for multi-goals firms such as MFIs that target 
both financial and social objectives. It allows employees and clients to know the objectives 
settled by the MFI (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al, 2009; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Accion, 2013). 
According to Biancini et al (2017), the incentive scheme is very important for MFIs to reach 
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the poorest. Indeed, incentives provide an extrinsic reward in terms of wage, and intrinsic 
rewards through the recognition of efforts and results (OECD, 2005). In addition, Kraft and 
Ugarkovic (2006) show that this incentive scheme is appropriate in well-organized firms 
where tasks are overlapped making difficult the quantification of individual contributions. For 
this purpose, the individual incentive system is no longer appropriate (Maltarich, et al, 2017). 
Overall, incentive compensation aims to ensure good governance, to induce innovation among 
employees and to have the employee interested in the financial situation of the firm by 
establishing a link between the employee and their compensation (Laske and Schroeder, 2016; 
Gibbs et al, 2017). Compensations is therefore a very dynamic human resources management 
practice. In the competitive environment, it is important to manage the compensation scheme 
well, because they act differently and determine the attitudes and the behaviors of employees. 
Moreover, they also affect the firms’ performance through attraction and retention of 
employees in firms. Incentive scheme have therefore the primary aim to influence the 
employee’s productivity and to design appropriate labor contract in MFIs. Consequently, 
incentives can take two forms namely: Non-financial incentives and financial incentives 
(Ekpudu and Okafor, 2012). Indeed, in a context of globalization, with permanent mobility of 
labor, some employees are attracted by the compensation inside or outside the microfinance 
sector. For instance, when employees in MFIs are treated like those in banking sector, they 
may become more productive and enhance the performance of the MFI (Besley and Ghatak, 
2005; Obembe et al, 2016).  
This paper is devoted to the productive effects of incentive scheme in MFIs and shows the 
role of capacity building on the productivity of employees and consequently on the 
performance of MFIs in Benin. The paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews 
the related literature followed by the methodology in section3. Section4 displays results and 
discussion. We end the paper with a concluding remark in the last section.  
2. Literature review 
Leibenstein (1957) argues that individual production is an increasing function of real wage. 
Therefore, a rise in wage increases the productivity as well as the direct cost of labor. 
Similarly, the efficiency wages model assumes that performance is not verifiable and no 
incentive contract is possible. The efficiency wage theory predicts that it may be beneficial for 
employers to increase wages beyond their competitive level in order to improve labor 
productivity (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2001). In the same way, Akerlof (1982) proposed a 
sociological approach of efficiency wage based on gratification between employees and 
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employers. According to Akerlof, the employee’s performance depends on the employer. One 
way for the employer to have the employee perform well is to offer wages higher than a 
reservation wage (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Ennasri and Willinger, 2014;	  Falola et al, 
2014). The effect of wage on the productivity depends on whether the compensation 
positively affects the worker’s effort. In the context of wage stickiness where all employees 
with the same qualification are paid the same wage, the best way for employers to retain his 
employees and prevent them of shirking is to offer wages above the reservation wage. In 
addition, an incentive wage may prove to be a substitute for monitoring (Prescott, 1998; 
Bental and Demougin, 2006; Friebel et al, 2015). Incentive theory refers to methods and 
concepts of analyzing situations in which agents do not perfectly observe all the 
characteristics of their environment because information is asymmetric (Omollo, 2015). 
Indeed, the “principal/ agent” model is one of the most popular model used to analyze these 
situations. For that an incentive problem occurs since the gain of both the principal and the 
agent depends on the hidden information by the agent. The principal offers incentive contracts 
which might reveal his information to undertake good actions (Jaffee et Russell, 1976; Labie 
et al, 2009). Asymmetric information result then from the difference between what the 
employee knows about his productivity (Jaffee and Russell, 1976) and what the employer 
expects from the employee in terms of effort. Furthermore, the asymmetric information arises 
because the employee’s effort is not perfectly observable (Mkhabela, 2018). It is therefore 
beneficial to correct some of the problems of asymmetric information and specifically moral 
hazard problem between the principal and the agent. That is the overall objective of the 
incentive scheme. Indeed, incentive is fundamental for MFIs that pursue several objectives 
such as profitability and outreach (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Shea, 2012; Falola et al, 2014; 
Giné et al, 2017). In addition, incentive pay seek to relate the employee’s performance to their 
compensation and then to relate the employer’s interests to that of the employee (Clark et al, 
2006). In other words, the employee works indirectly for themselves while working for the 
employer. Their objectives are therefore merged and the asymmetric information is reduced 
(Kian and Wan Yusoff, 2015). However, asymmetric information is considerably reduced by 
extrinsic motivation compensation such as wage, bonus and others forms of compensations 
which affect the employee productivity more than the intrinsic motivation (Gerhart and Fang, 
2015; Nuru et al, 2017). Labie et al (2009) argues that incentive contracts lead the agent and 
particularly the credit officer to achieve the objective settled by the MFI. Similarly, Kraft and 
Ugarkovic (2006) show that incentive scheme is appropriate in well-organized firms where 
tasks are overlapping making difficult the measurement of individual performance. In the 
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same way, Nyberg et al (2018) pointed out that firms establish incentive scheme in order to 
have employees focus on profit maximization and cost minimization problem. Incentive 
scheme is an indicator for good governance and power balance in firms (Labie and Mersland, 
2011). In this context, Englmaie et al, (2018) show that as extrinsic and financial incentive 
scheme, bonus systems affect significantly and positively employee’s productivity in firms. 
They further note that this effect is more significant for collective incentives because it affects 
team work. However, employees do not no longer look for original solutions but rather the 
solution that may help them to achieve their goal rapidly. Delfgaauw et al, (2017) and Friebel 
et al. (2017) show that collective incentive that include both managers and employees are the 
most productive. In fact, investigating the productive effect of incentives based on collective 
performance in a German distribution chain, Friebel et al (2017) show that in spite of 
performance, collective performance-based incentives increase employee’s productivity by 
about 3% as opposed to fixed pay. Delfgaauw et al, (2017) also show that collective 
incentives generally in terms of non-financial incentives and others forms of gratifications 
reduce favoritism in task assignment and favor group performance. Besides, Takahashi et al. 
(2016) note that the magnitude of the incentive effect depends on the task to be executed. 
Moreover, incentives enhance creation of ideas and drive employees to excel (Laske and 
Schroeder, 2016; Gibbs et al, 2017). On the other side, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) insist on 
the risk aversion of economic agent. With incentive contract, employees are compelled to bear 
some of the production risk which otherwise would have been entirely absorbed by the 
employer. In this way, we note that the employee will assume as much risk as in absence of 
incentive and is thereby subject to an additional risk pertained to the variability in 
productivity and consequently of their pay. Hart and Holmstrom (1987) point out that in the 
single case of fixed wage regardless of the employee’s performance, the employment contract 
guarantees a fixed pay for the employee regardless of their productivity. As a result, the 
employee tends not to provide optimal effort. The opposite happens in the case of incentive 
contract. The incentive contract removes the invariability of the compensation and leads the 
employee to be performant. The effectiveness of the incentive contract rests on its ability to 
manage the tradeoff between the variability of the wage pertained to the incentive scheme and 
the response of the employee to this new variability. The incentive contract must therefore 
protect the employee against eventual risks pertaining their productivity and simultaneously 
provide them a return on their performance (PWC, 2017). That may have different effects on 
the production and labor. Kruse (1992) identifies three additional effects of incentives: they 
increase the labor effort; develop a qualified labor and generate a flow of information for an 
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effective management in the firm. Even though that does not create problems in a single firm 
with only one employee, the incentive contract becomes complex in firms with many 
employees (McCormack et al, 2010) making it difficult to measure individual productivity 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In the case of team production, the total amount of production 
is not necessarily the summation of individual productions. This explains why the incentive 
contract is based on the collective production and it is not separable (Friebel et al. 2017; 
Delfgaauw et al, 2017). However, such measure of team performance creates the free-riding 
problem and indirectly that of firm size (Lazear, 1998; Nyberg, 2018; Englmaie et al, 2018). 
This is obvious in the case of medium and large size firms with more than fifty employees. 
Since incentives depend on team effort, the additional productive effort of a worker is 
inversely proportional to the firm’s size. In a large firm, an employee may realize that their 
contribution to the team is minimal and then could be tempted not to work hard for the MFI. 
The expected effect of the free riding on the firm’s performance will depend on the number of 
employees behaving like that. This effect may be positive and greater than it would have been 
without incentive but lesser than when all employees work in the same team (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2004; Nyberg, 2018). According to Lazear (1998), free riding dilutes the effect of 
incentives. Conversely, Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that firms where interaction and 
pressure among employees exists, partnership and incentives coexist, it is likely that the 
negative effect of free riding will be reduced. It will therefore be difficult to nod about the real 
effect of incentives in that context. The issue on the positive tradeoff between the various 
forms of incentives and the firm performance is almost unanimous in literature.  
Most of the studies on this topic are on industrial firms and therefore there is a gap about the 
effects incentives might have on firms that provide service such as microfinance institutions. 
This because in microfinance sector, output is not easily quantifiable and the productive effect 
of incentive is not measurable even if it is a captivating task (Gramlich, 1976). Microfinance 
institution provide an experimental plot to assess the productive effect of incentive scheme 
since the labor factor is considerably used in the production process. In addition, MFIs 
provide an environment for both individual and team work in the monitoring process of 
borrowers. This may reduce free riding and enhance the effect of incentive when they are well 
designed and implemented (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Accion, 2013). 
3. Methodology  
Empirical literature on the adoption of an incentive scheme is almost exclusively devoted to 
manufacturing firms and makes use of various econometric approaches. However, concerning 
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the productivity analysis of MFIs, there are plenty of studies. Table1 displays the outlines of 
some studies on MFIs’ productivity as well as their econometric approaches. Indeed, based on 
large sample, some studies use the difference in difference matching approach to estimate the 
productive effect of incentive schemes. This approach constitutes a limitation for MFI sector 
because of data constraints. Other studies estimate that relationship by using the OLS method 
or 3LS on a panel of firms. However, the OLS method has been largely criticized because of 
the eventual correlation and endogeneity problems. Therefore, some authors propose to 
correct these issues by using for instance the two-step Heckman approach (Drolet et al, 1999). 
Finally, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
are also used to estimate the efficiency and productivity of MFIs.  
 
   Table1: Some empirical studies on productivity analysis of MFIs  
Authors Data source Methodology Explanatory variables Dependent variable 
Fall et al (2018) 262 observations, 38 MFIs Meta regression (DEA and SFA) Inputs and outputs Technical Efficiency average 
Wijesiri et al (2015) 36 MFIs in Sri Lanka DEA Total Assets 
Number of loan officers 
Costs per borrower 
  
Outstanding credit 
financial Revenue 
Number of active borrowers 
Bassem (2014) 33 MFIs in the Middle East 
and North Africa 
DEA-based Malmquist index Number of employees 
operational expenditure 
Indicator income for the 
poorest 
Interest income and 
commissions 
Quayes (2012) 702 MFIs in 83 countries, 
Mix Market 
OLS, logistic regression, 3MCO Credit Amount; ratio of 
total expenditure, cost per 
borrower; 
 
Average amount of credit to 
GDP; Percentage of women 
borrowers 
Hermes et al (2011) 435 MFI Mixmarket Stochastic Frontier Analysis total costs Ln (average amount of credit) 
Bassem (2010) 42 MFI in 21 countries, 
Mixmarket 
MCO Total Assets of the MFI; 
age of the MFI; form of 
organization; mode of 
governance; regulation 
Number of active borrowers; 
Average credit Amounts on 
GDP per capita 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al 
(2009) 
89 MFIs, Mixmarket DEA Financial revenue; 
outstanding portfolio 
Number of women credit 
recipients; dummy of poorest 
recipients 
Jones and Kato 
(1995) 
109 Japanese Firms MCO Total Assets as a proxy of 
capital; Number of 
employees 
Added value  
 
In light of the above studies, we consider a simple Cobb Douglas production model 
augmented by the Incentive scheme in this paper. We specifically follow Bhargava (1994), 
and Jones and Kato (1995) in their studies on firms in United Kingdom and Japan 
respectively. They provide an evidence on the productive effect of financial incentives in 
firms. We first conduct the Hausman test to check which of fixed effect model or random 
effect model is appropriate to this study. After the Hausman test, we estimate a random effect 
model with robust standard errors on an unbalanced panel of 14 MFIs in Benin. The Robust 
option allows to correct the hetereskedasticity and serial correlation issues. One of advantages 
of random effect model is that it allows to estimate the time invariant variables (Hausman and 
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Taylor, 1981). In addition, the random effect model is usually used to analyze the behavior 
and the performance of MFIs (Hartarska, 2005; Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013; quoted by 
Hudon and Périlleux, 2015).  
Model Specification 
Assuming that the production technology used by the MFI is as Cobb Douglas form 
augmented by Incentive scheme (IS), the empirical model includes potential groups of 
variables and is presented as follows: 
𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝒇[𝑿, (𝑭𝑰𝑺)𝒊𝒕, (𝑵𝑭𝑰𝑺)𝒊𝒕,  𝜶𝒊,𝜶𝒕]+  𝜺𝒊𝒕      
Where P𝑖𝑡 represents the productivity of the MFI i at period t categorized in breadth and depth 
of the outreach and financial productivity in terms of Return on Asset (ROA) and Financial 
Revenue (FR). (𝐹𝐼𝑆)!" and (𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑆)!" are respectively the dummy variables of Financial Incentive 
Scheme (FIS) and Non-Financial Incentive scheme (NFIS) taking 1 for presence of a form of incentive 
scheme and 0 otherwise. X is a matrix of explanatory variable such as Total asset as proxy of 
capital factor used by the MFI i at period t;  𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐  represent respectively the age and the 
legal structure of the MFI. 𝜶𝒊 represents the MFI fixed specific effect, 𝜶𝒕 time specific effect and 𝜺𝒊𝒕    is the error term.  Table A1 displays the empirical specification of each composante of 
social and financial productivity. 
4. Data and Variables  
4.1.Source 
A sample of 14 registered MFIs in Benin over the period 2007-2017 is used in this study. 
Therefore, the size of our panel is 154 observations. These MFIs reflect well the overall MFIs 
in the microfinance sector in Benin. Selection of MFIs is based on the number of diamonds 
assigned by the Mixmarket to indicate the reliability and the availability of information 
pertaining to MFIs. As a matter of fact, all the MFIs of our sample have at least three 
diamonds reflecting the pertinence of our selection.  Our data is drawn from three sources, 
namely: the “Mixmarket”, the “Cellule de Surveillance des Structures de Financement 
Décentralisé (CSSFD)” and our own survey conducted in 2017 with the support of 
Consortium Alafia. We initially sent a short questionnaire by mail to 32 MFIs with a response 
rate of 53%. That is, only 17 MFIs provided the requested information on the human resource 
management practices. We then checked for MFIs that matched with Mixmarket criterion as 
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far as the number of diamonds is concerned. We therefore came out with 14 MFIs that 
constituted our sample at the end of the selection process. 
4.2. Indicators of Productivity  
Productivity is measured in microfinance sector through the social productivity (outreach) and 
the financial productivity (Return On asset or Financial Revenue) (Bassem, 2009; Schreiner, 
2002). The most used indicators of social productivity of MFIs are the Breadth and the Depth 
of the outreach. The depth of the Outreach indicates the amount of credit on GDP per capita 
and shows how the MFI targets the most disadvantaged people. In a situation of complete 
information, the depth can be measured by aggregating the personal equity ratio of each 
borrower and tests whether the MFI actually provides credit to the poor regardless of their 
wealth. Since the information is not complete, some authors use the average volume of credit 
divided by the per capita GDP to approximate the depth of the outreach. A feeble depth 
indicates that the MFI has targeted the poorest (Cull et al, 2007; Kai, 2009; Hermes et al, 
2011; Quayes, 2012). The Breadth of the outreach refers to the size of the clientele served by 
the MFI even if it entails non-poor clients. We proxy the breadth of the outreach by the 
logarithm of the number of active borrowers. The active borrower refers to the one that has an 
outstanding credit with the MFI. This indicator reported to the number of employees informs 
on the way the MFI adapts its methods and procedures for the sake of its activities. A feeble 
productivity as regard to this indicators does not mean that employees work less but indicates 
that procedures are inefficient (Microrate, 2003). As far as the financial productivity is 
concerned, we consider in this study the ROA and financial revenue that provide information 
on the sustainability of MFIs. 
4.3. Potential explanatory variables   
 
Incentive scheme 
Also known as profit sharing, the incentive scheme appears under various forms in MFIs.  
There are Financial Incentive Scheme (FIS) and Non-Financial incentive Scheme (NFIS). In 
addition, there exists different types of incentives such as individual incentive and collective 
incentive directly related to the incentive forms (Alchian et Demsetz, 1972; Al-Qudah, 2016).  
For instance, output bonus and other forms of gratification are popular indicators of individual 
performance in MFIs in Benin. There is for example the quarterly bonus related to the amount 
of outstanding portfolio of the credit officer. This portfolio is risky when more than 5% of 
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borrowers renege to their commitment vis-à-vis the payment of the credit. Incentives exist in 
MFIs at different level: there are incentive for staff and incentive for managers. Moreover, a 
combination of individual and collective incentives exists in some MFIs. In this study, we 
have binary information on the presence (absence) of each of those categories of incentive. 
Unfortunately, the observations on that issue is not large enough because the MFI considers as 
team work the aggregate output of its offices. However, the size of the sample and the quality 
of available information on the labor market characteristic in MFIs do not allow to dissociate 
individual and collective productive effects of individual and collective incentives. We 
therefore consider a binary approach in one hand of presence of financial or non-financial 
incentive in the MFI regardless to the frequency, the generosity, the compensation method 
and in other hand the MFIs without incentive scheme and do not practise any of the financial 
and non-financial incentives. Although, it is a strong assumption, incentives are considered in 
this study as equivalent from a MFI to another when they exist either as financial or non-
financial form. Besides, we would have allowed two years lags so that the productive effect of 
incentives will be effective in MFIs. This because it is improbable that an introduction of an 
incentive scheme immediately enhances the productivity of the MFI. The response period 
may be reasonably more than one or two years. In addition, a new introduction of incentive 
scheme must consider the outcomes of its experimental phase. Finally, the adoption of 
incentive scheme is fundamental albeit its effect are not prompt as well as like others Human 
Resources Management Practices. Unfortunately, there is not enough information concerning 
performance indicators of Human Resources Management Practices in MFIs. For Wadhwani 
& Wall (1990), incentives schemes are adopted in well managed firms. Therefore, the 
coefficients related to incentives scheme dummy variables will inform on the quality of 
management of MFIs. Similarly, Conte & Svejnar (1990) argue that firms that adopt incentive 
scheme prove to be more efficient and their employees are more qualified than those from 
other conventional firms. 
  Total Asset  
The total asset is a proxy for the capital and gives indication on the size of the MFI. Relevant 
information can be provided to determine the efforts supplied by employees and therefore the 
performance of the firm (Akben-Selcuk, 2016). Three main types of physical capital measures 
are used in the microfinance sector: Building, information technology (IT) and office 
equipment. The first two are the most important. We wanted to generate a measure of IT 
capital that can be defined as all equipment used for processing and exchanging electronic 
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information. The IT represents an important production factor for the financial sector. The 
main difficulty was to obtain a quantifiable measure of IT capital that accurately represents 
the technological capacity of firms especially in rural areas where some MFIs do not even use 
it. For MacIntosh & Shwartz (1995) the size of the firm in terms of the size of the asset can be 
used as proxy for capital. Indeed, using the asset as control variable will neutralize the 
possible gaps generated by the size of MFIs of our sample on the coefficients of other 
variables particularly the constant. The literature displays four measures of the size namely:  
The sales, log of the sales, total asset and log of the total asset. We therefore opt to the log of 
total asset instead of other measures in order to neutralize the size effect pertaining to it.  
Number of employees 
One of the most used measure of labor in the literature is the linear summation of all 
categories of employees such as executives, credit officers and others employees. Such a 
measure of labor supposes that there is an equal contribution of each category to the aggregate 
output even though it seems irrational. However, we consider that it is impossible to match 
each composante of the output to an exclusive group of worker that’s why we consider the 
linear summation of all employees regardless their category. In addition, it was not possible to 
get information on compensation of each group of employee that would allow to weight the 
measures and estimate their productivity. In doing so, it would require to cancel prejudicially 
some part of our sample. Finally, some of MFIs such as CLCAM employ only one or two 
workers. It is then judicious to suppose that employees provide equivalent effort in those 
MFIs even though this way of doing limits the possibility of weighting we would have 
operated.  
Age  
The Age of the MFI is categorized as New, Young and Mature. The age is an important 
determinant of productivity and efficiency of MFIs. It appears as the age of MFI itself and the 
age of MFIs in the microfinance network. Indeed, Gonzalez (2008) found that the productive 
effect of age is very high during the first six years and varies between 2% and 8%. This effect 
decline as a result of the maturity. This reflects the ability of the MFI to build a solid basis of 
clientele the first years of its operations leading to a great efficiency. Likewise, the age of 
others MFIs in the sector of microfinance affects substantially the productivity of each MFI 
belonging to that sector. This because, there is a learning process among the nascent MFIs and 
the mature MFIs. For instance, the nascent MFIs belonging to “consortium Alafia” an 
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association of MFIs in Benin, enjoy the expertise of the most mature in that association. 
Besides, Mahinda & Meoli (2015) in their study on the productivity change of MFIs in 
Kenya, using Malmquist approach showed that mature MFIs are less productive than the 
young MFIs. That supports the fact that in getting old, the MFI losses its ability to cope new 
challenges and becomes less competitive. 
Structure or legal status 
It is a set of dummy variables that indicate the organizational form of MFIs in terms of Not 
for Profit Organization (NPO), cooperative (COOP) and Shareholder Firm (SHF) 
microfinance. Studies find cooperatives more productive and efficient than other form of 
MFIs (Mersland and Strøm, 2008; Nosa and Ose, 2010; Safarova, 2010; Fakhfakh et al, 2011). 
5-Results and discussions 
Table2 displays the descriptive statistics of data used in this study. The sample is constituted 
by cooperatives (57.14%) followed by NPO (35.71%) and SHF (7.15 %). On average, the 
number of employees per MFI is approximately 32 although some of them employ only 2 
workers for all their operations. Furthermore, despite the low productivity of some MFIs of 
the sample, it is significant to mention that in terms of performance of credit officers, the 
MFIs at plays in this study perform better in terms of the norms settled by the Central Bank of 
WAEMU (BCEAO). For instance, concerning the operations of credit, each credit officer 
manages approximately 245 active clients, which is greater than the 115 targeted by the 
Central Bank and the 152 by other regulatory institutions of the microfinance sector in Africa. 
Indeed, more than 30% of MFIs belonging to Consortium Alafia, an association of 
microfinance institutions, have a ratio of portfolio monitoring between 200 and 400 clients. 
However, the low value of the depth of the outreach (12433) indicates that MFIs actually 
target the disadvantaged people. In addition, it is worthwhile to add that the financial 
productivity in terms of financial revenue is approximately 30 million FCFA with a standard 
deviation of 752000 FCFA meaning the high variability of financial performance of MFIs. 
Reversely, in terms of profitability on asset, those MFIs are poorly performing. 
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Table2 : Descriptive statistics 
      
Continuous Variables Obs. Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Breadth 154 15967.59 23167.69 269 115556 
Depth  140 12433.15 19027.3 0 78790.96 
ROA 154 -0.0278 0.1389 -1.7596 0.3110 
Financial Revenue  138 3.01 E+07 7.52 E+08 -3.35 E+09 2.21 E+09 
Total Asset 154 8.82 E +9 1.40 E+10 2.63 E+7 6.47 E+10 
Number of employees 154 131.2626 189.5423 2 902.7813 
Categorical Variables (frequency of« YES » in %)  
Incentive Scheme 
Financial Incentive Scheme 154 57.14    
Non-Financial Incentive Scheme 154 53.83    
Structures      
Cooperative 154 57.14    
NPO microfinance 154 35.71    
SHF microfinance 154 07.14    
Age of the MFI      
New 154 11.03    
Young 154 23.37    
Mature 154 67.53    
Source: Authors, 2018 
As a matter of fact, the performance of MFIs depends fundamentally on the employed labor 
and its corollaries. In addition to the fixed wage that crucially affects the employee’s effort, 
there is a stochastic component that affects more the employee’s effort and then appears as a 
solution to free riding and asymmetric information issues in MFIs. Fifty seven percent of 
MFIs in the sample practice a financial incentive plan while fifty three percent, practice a 
non-financial incentive plan. This supports the importance of a simultaneous adoption of both 
the financial and non-financial incentive scheme in firms such as MFIs that mainly exploits 
labor to their financial operations. Therefore, a motivated employee is willing to provide 
considerable effort in order to achieve the assigned objectives for the sake of the performance 
of the MFI. In accordance with available data on microfinance sector, the data used in this 
study show that in MFIs that have clearly and effectually designed and implemented incentive 
scheme, staff productivity is greater than the one of MFIs without such an incentive scheme. 
Incentive scheme encourage employees in general and credit officers particularly to avoid 
adverse selections by distinguishing good borrowers from the bad ones and to limit 
outstanding payment risk in the MFI. However, the performance of MFIs through the 
productivity of employees does not only depend on incentive scheme. Indeed, field surveys 
show that practices such as the election of the best employee, the career plans, the endowment 
of equipment, the participation of employees in decision making and others forms of 
gratifications are as many non-financial motivations that affect employees and particularly 
credit officers in MFIs. Moreover, the literature reviews some intrinsic and extrinsic factors 
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that characterize the MFI and substantially affect its performance. We retained in this study 
the age of the MFI categorized as New, Young and Mature; the structure or the legal status in 
terms of mutual and cooperative (coop), NPO microfinance and share holding Firm (SHF) 
microfinance. Therefore, the statistics show that about 67.53% of MFIs are in maturity phase, 
23.37% of MFIs are young and 11.03% of them are new. Fundamentally, a New MFI 
becomes young after five years and mature after ten years.  
 
Regression results are presented in Table3. All diagnostic and validation tests pertaining to 
panel data estimation indicate that the random effect model is appropriate for this data. All the 
R square of models except that of ROA are more than 70% meaning that the explanatory 
variables explain the dependent variables well. They respectively explain the Breadth, the 
Depth, the ROA and the Financial Revenue model at 83.03%, 95.15%, 11.51% and 70.27%. 
The Breadth and the Depth are the social productivity indicators of the MFI and are 
respectively measured by the logarithm of the number of active borrowers and the logarithm 
of the amount of credit on the GDP per capita. We considered in this study the ROA and the 
financial Revenue as indicators of financial productivity. Moreover, giving the possibility of 
hetereskedasticity and serial correlation that often occur in cross section and time series data, 
we therefore estimated the models with robust option on the same explanatory variables. 
Results from robust estimations confirm those from the simple random effect estimations 
suggested by the Hausman test. 
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Table3: Random effect models estimations (robust) 
 
 Social Productivity Financial Productivity 
 Breadth Depth ROA Financial revenue 
     
Total Asset  0.243** 0.716*** 0.0173 0.685*** 
 (0.100) (0.102) (0.0175) (0.151) 
Number of employees 0.734*** 0.307*** -0.0174 0.106 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.0222) (0.201) 
Incentive scheme 
Financial Incentive -0.744*** -0.0414 0.0656** 0.159 
 (0.199) (0.132) (0.0323) (0.340) 
Non-Financial Incentive 0.862*** 0.000232 -0.0294 0.0460 
 (0.148) (0.0633) (0.0352) (0.142) 
Structures 
SHF microfinance (base category) 
COOP 1.094*** -0.683***    0.0752*** 1.588*** 
 (0.266) (0.117) (0.0272) (0.314) 
NPO microfinance 1.141*** -0.355** 0.0506 1.898*** 
 (0.216) (0.142) (0.0318) (0.203) 
Age of the MFI 
New (Base category) 
Young 0.0377 -0.106 0.0917 -0.395 
 (0.0867) (0.102) (0.0657) (0.306) 
Mature -0.222** -0.113 0.0963 0.0261 
 (0.111) (0.172) (0.0805) (0.447) 
Constant -0.531 -7.808*** -0.492 0.735 
 (1.872) (1.772) (0.357) (2.707) 
Observations 154 140 154 105 
Number of MFIs 14 14 14 14 
R² Within 
     Between 
     Overall                                       
 0.4030 
 0.8817 
 0.8303 
0.6822  
0.9968 
0.9515   
 0.1149 
 0.1267 
 0.1151 
0.3526 
0.8242 
0.7027 
(.)  robust standard error ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Authors, 2018 
 
The estimates results show that the breadth component of the outreach is more sensitive than 
the other three indicators to factors affecting the productivity of MFIs. In accordance with 
some empirical literatures (Oburu and Atambo, 2016; Locke, 2004; Rohn, 1993), results point 
out that incentive schemes either financial or non-financial significantly affect the 
productivity and therefore the performance of the MFI at 1% level. Indeed, the non-financial 
incentive scheme positively and significantly impacts the ROA but has a reverse effect on the 
Breadth of the outreach. Consequently, an adoption of non-financial incentive in terms of 
career plan, freedom in work, participation of employees in decisions making in the MFI and 
other forms of gratifications increase the Breadth component of the outreach of 86,2%. 
Similarly, an adoption of financial incentives in terms of bonus for instance increases the 
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ROA of 6.5%. However, financial incentives are indeed a powerful tool in boosting MFI’s 
performance but are not without limitations in some cases. Therefore, results suggest that the 
number of active borrowers per employee declines by 74.4 % in response to an additional 
adoption of financial incentive in terms of increase of bonus. Though, this finding seems 
paradoxical, it confirms some theories on incentives that support an adverse effect of financial 
incentives on firms’ performance. Indeed, some authors argue that a main adverse effect of 
incentives is that agents become themselves bonus pursuer. For instance, the establishment of 
an individual bonus divides the agents instead of rallying them. Further, it is difficult to assess 
the team’s effect of an individual financial incentive. There are sometimes within a team, 
employees with different and often contradictory objectives. Moreover, some employees such 
as credit officers come out easily with risky borrowers to increase their individual production 
to the detriment of collective production (Oburu and Atambo, 2016, Delfgaauw et al, 2015; 
Friebel et al., 2017). Although the coefficient indicating the productive effect of non-financial 
incentives seems excessive, it is also consistent with some theories and confirm empirical 
results on that issue in MFIs (Tian & Yang, 2014; Oburu & Atambo, 2016;	  Delfgaauw et al, 
2017; Friebel et al., 2017; Nyberg, 2018). For instance, Oburu and Atambo (2016) found that 
non-financial compensations are more productive than financial compensations in 
Wakenyapamoja, a microfinance institution in Kenya. Their also found that the participation 
of employees in decisions making , the well-designed career plans and appropriate working 
environments in MFIs are main factors motivating employees to appreciate their job and to 
give the best of themselves. Reversely, these results oppose those found by Ariely et al. 
(2007). Indeed, comparing the productive effects of monetary and non-monetary incentive, 
they found that monetary incentive are more productive than non-monetary incentive in 
private firms particularly in service offering companies. However, they also find that the 
effect is quite the opposite; that is the non- monetary incentive are more productive than 
monetary incentive in the case of public companies. Besides, many other variables affect the 
productivity of service offering companies such as MFIs. The results displays that variables 
such as total asset and the number of employees are positively related to social and financial 
indicators of productivity except the return on Asset (ROA). Indeed, the total asset of the MFI 
positively and significantly affect the productivity of the MFI at 1% level. This result confirm 
the study by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) that argue that the total asset is one of best 
measures of firms size and prove to be a pertinent indicator of performance in the 
microfinance sector. Therefore, a one percent increase of the total asset significantly increases 
the breadth and the depth component of the outreach by respectively 24.3% and 71.6% and 
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the financial revenue by 68.45%. Similarly, the labor plays an important role in the 
microfinance sector. The productivity of the MFI even the one of employees substantially 
depends on the number of employees because of the division of labor pertaining to the 
production in that sector. Our results indicate therefore a positive and significant impact of 
73.35% and 30.7% of the number of employees on the breadth and the depth component of 
the outreach. Unfortunately, despite the positive coefficients related to the financial 
productivity indicators, we cannot interpret them due to their non-significance. These results 
can be explained by the fact that the financial performance of the MFI imposes to rationalize 
the operational and administrative costs in substituting labor by new technologies. However, 
some studies have evidenced the determinant role of organizational structure and age in the 
productivity of MFIs. Thus, the results show that the legal status of MFIs affect variously the 
social and financial productivity of MFIs. Although the literature indicates a strong 
relationship between the age and the performance of firms like MFIs, our results are silent on 
that issue in exception of the Breadth which negatively respond to the age of the MFI. The 
first categories of these variables are omitted in the result for the sake of comparison with 
respect to the base category. As result, being in the category of cooperative increases 
significantly by 109%, 7.52% and 158% the productive effect that a SHF microfinance would 
have on the Breadth, the depth and the financial revenue of the MFI. Therefore, the literature 
indicates that cooperatives and NPO microfinance are considered as compatible with social 
objectives of poverty alleviation via the magnitude of the Breadth because of their approaches 
based on group borrowers (Tortia, 2018). In contrary, the ROA of a cooperative is less than 
the one of SHF microfinance. Similarly, the breadth, the ROA and the financial revenue of the 
cooperatives increase significantly by 114.1%, 7.52% and 158.8% respectively compared to 
the SHF microfinance. This effect is approximatively -35.5% on the depth component of the 
outreach. Indeed, Perilleux (2012) indicates that cooperatives and NPO microfinance are more 
efficient than SHF microfinance because they set apart some of their profits to clients and 
employees instead of investing all the profits. All these findings support the relationship 
between the legal status and the productivity of the MFI. In addition, the coefficient related to 
mature in the variable age is -0.22 and is significant at 5% level. This confirms the fact that 
nascent MFIs requires times to make profit on their investments. However, in getting old, the 
MFI becomes more productive till its maturity phase where it starts declining because of the 
inability to cope new challenges in the market and the aggressive competition by other young 
MFIs.  
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Conclusion 
This paper empirically analyzes the productive effect of incentive scheme in microfinance 
institutions based on an unbalanced panel of 14 registered MFIs over the period 2007-2017 in 
Benin. Estimated results of the random effect models suggested by the Hausman test show 
that the adoption of a well-designed incentive scheme either financial or non-financial affects 
significantly but diversely the employee’s productivity and then the performance of the MFI. 
However, the findings also show that non-financial incentives are more productive than 
financial incentives. Although the effects of incentives on the financial productivity is 
confusing, it is worthwhile to mention that there is a narrow link between social productivity 
and financial productivity. Therefore, in targeting a large number of active clients, the 
employee indirectly contributes to the financial productivity of the MFI. Similarly, a financial 
performing MFI is able to easily achieve the social objective of serving a large number of 
poor. Moreover, a systematic adoption of an incentive scheme should strictly consider factors 
that do not lead to free riding in MFIs. This may specifically make the staff and the credit 
officers to increase their production and to contribute to a resolute performance of the MFI. 
However, collective based incentives are more productive than individual based incentives 
which lead employees to bonus seeking regardless to the overall performance of the MFI. 
Consequently, a well designed and implemented incentive scheme may significantly affect the 
productivity, the efficiency and the quality of operations made by MFIs. The design of the 
incentive scheme must then be transparent and target very clear objectives in order to have all 
the concerned employees understand its mechanism. It should not vary arbitrary on purpose of 
the managers and should be equitable and have feasible objectives. Last but the most 
important, the incentive scheme should reward the best employees such as credit officers and 
debt collectors in order to have other employees to mimic them and discourage free riding 
(Labie et al., 2009). 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1 : Empirical specification of models 
Explanatory variables 
 
Dependent variables 
Constance lnasset lnstaff      RIF RINF Age struc 
 breadth  𝛼! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 
Depth 𝛼! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 
 ROA 𝛼! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 
 Finrev 𝛼! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 𝛽!,! 
 
